Turkey has repeatedly claimed, decades before the invasion and often after, that Cyprus is of crucial strategic importance to it. Ankara has opposed a large number of UN resolutions calling for the withdrawal of its occupying forces from the island. About 142,000 Greek Cypriots living in the north – almost a quarter of the population of Cyprus – have been forcibly expelled from the occupied northern part of the island, where they made up 80% of the population, and are forbidden to return to their homes and belongings. The U.S. Congress imposed an embargo on arms sales to Turkey, which led to tensions and mistrust between Turkey and the United States. [Citation needed] President Özal supported the position of the United States during the Gulf War (2 August 1990 – 17 January 1991). Turkey`s economic relations with Iraq were extensive and their disruption harmed the country. Turkey lost about $60 billion during the conflict due to the closure of the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline. Shortly before the war, the Turkish Chief of the General Staff, General Necip Torumtay, resigned due to a disagreement over the inclusion of Turkish ground troops in the conflict, which prevented Turkey from active military involvement. Turkey has authorized United Nations forces (UN Security Council Resolution 665) to carry out missions from its air bases; In this way, Turkey remained a platform for US attacks on Iraq for the rest of the conflict. Turkey played a role in the war by holding a significant part of the Iraqi army on the Turkish-Iraqi border. The situation as a whole is therefore a balkanized Syria with blurred and violent boundaries between the areas of control and widespread human suffering.
Any new military initiative by Turkey in the Northeast would spark outrage – and possible sanctions – from the US and Europe. A decision by the Syrian regime and Russia in Idlib would trigger a humanitarian catastrophe on a scale not seen since Aleppo, and possibly a Turkish military response. The justified sense of abandonment of Turkey by the international community and the political despair of ErdoCean would have uncertain consequences, but a new crisis on the Turkish-Greek border would be expected. Depending on the timing – in other words, if the damage hasn`t already been done – a Russian-backed attack on Idlib could torpedo Russian-Turkish relations and reduce the chances of another S-400 purchase or other defensive cooperation. So Syria has no shortage of potential hot spots. This redefinition of U.S. external engagement is a byproduct of a global vision in which the White House believes that the world is at a turning point and that the future of the world order will be determined by competition between the Alliance of Democratic Nations and major authoritarian states, particularly China and Russia.30 Its external goal is to help American allies. The strengthening and reconstruction of democracy is therefore in line with its strategic mission of combating the rise of democracy.30 Authoritarianism. Yet it is easier to imagine how such a foreign policy should be implemented when America`s adversaries are authoritarian nations, and far less obvious when America`s own allies, including Turkey, India, and Poland, are involved in democratic regression. The problem came to a head in September 2014, when the Islamic State launched a campaign to take control of Rojava, a Kurdish province near Turkey. At that time, Turkey and the United States were still negotiating their participation in the intensification of the conflict. Turkey had proposed a militia led by a Sunni Arab-Syrian force to help in the campaign against the Islamic State, but the US “did not believe that these fighters were sufficiently `moderate` and suspected that they (like Turkish leader Recep Tayyip ErdoEan) were more focused on overthrowing the regime of Bashar al-Assad than on eliminating the Islamic State.” 20 Because Ankara was reluctant to intervene, Obama decided to transport weapons to Kurdish fighters.
In the end, Ankara and Washington failed to agree on the overall strategy to eradicate the Islamic State or the role each side would play. The Halkbank affair has also taken on a visible political dimension. It has been reported that the case has often been on the agenda of talks between ErdoAan and Trump. According to former national security adviser John Bolton, ErdoAan repeatedly raised the issue with Trump and tried to dismiss the case.44 Trump has been criticized for wanting to interfere in the functioning of the judicial system. He reportedly asked former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson to pressure the U.S. Department of Justice to drop the case. In an interview, Tillerson said he refused to do so and “rejected Trump`s efforts because he saw them as illegal interference.” 45 There have been separate allegations that Trump forced the resignation of Preet Bharara, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, and his successor, Geoffrey Berman, for failing to drop the case.46 As relations with the West deteriorated, Turkey`s political elites and security establishment decided to reduce the country`s dependence on Western systems. The domestic political narrative has changed considerably. The West, and the United States in particular, have been branded as enemies of Turkey.6 Political discourse has emphasized the need for Turkey to limit its dependence on the West. Russia`s wise response to the coup attempt – particularly Russian President Vladimir Putin`s swift demonstration to reach out to besieged ErdoAan – also helped accelerate this transition away from the Western orbit.
In this context, Turkey signed an agreement with Russia in mid-2017 on the acquisition of the S-400 system. This growing divergence in the way Ankara and Washington see the world creates a difficult environment to constructively address the range of bilateral disputes in force. This article examines five main areas of disagreement between the two countries and examines how the two sides could overcome these differences. At the top of the list of current disagreements is the acquisition of Russia`s S-400 air and missile defense system by turkey and the current United States. Support for Kurdish military and political factions in Syria. The consequences of the erosion of democratic norms in Turkey are also significant; the U.S. position on exiled Islamic preacher Fethullah Gülen, whom many in the Turkish government believe to be the architect of the failed coup attempt in Turkey in July 2016; the potential impact of Halkbank`s legal proceedings due to previous violations of sanctions against Iran; and the Biden administration`s decision to use the word “genocide” to refer to the murders and deportations of Ottoman Armenians during World War I. Under these circumstances, it is clear that Turkey-United States. The relationship needs to be redefined. Previous negotiations between Halkbank and the US authorities did not result in an agreement. There are several reasons for the failure of these talks. First, Trump`s personal efforts to suppress the investigation may have given Halkbank a false sense of confidence, and bank officials may not have had enough incentive to negotiate seriously under these skewed conditions.
Second, in these negotiations, Halkbank apparently defended the view that the violations were the result of negligence, while the Ministry of Finance wanted the defendant bank to accept its misconduct.48 From Halkbank`s perspective, acceptance of fault would have meant full disclosure of its illegal activities, which would then have had consequences for the bank`s international credibility and its ability to: That is why we have tabled a number of amendments. Currently, relations between Turkey and the United States are in a deep crisis. The meeting between the United States President Joe Biden and Turkish President Recep Tayyip ErdoÄan on the sidelines of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit in Brussels in June 2021 raised hopes that U.S.-Turkish relations can be put back on track. And yet, the recovery from the current crisis is uncertain, as the underlying factors that previously shaped the relationship have changed. In June 2008, the United States and Turkey began cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with a pact for the transfer of technology, materials, reactors and components for nuclear research and energy production in Turkey for an initial period of 15 years, followed by automatic extensions in five-year increments establishing a comprehensive framework for peaceful nuclear cooperation between the two countries. under the agreed non-proliferation conditions and controls. .